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This article was originally presented as a speech at the Middle Tennessee State University Annual
Economic Outlook Conference, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, September 29, 2006.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2007, 89(2), pp. 77-83.
gave recently, “Understanding the Fed,” which
was published in the St. Louis Fed’s Review and
is available on our web site.1
SOME BACKGROUND
More than three years ago now, in June 2003,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) set
its federal funds rate target at a 40-year low of 1
percent, completing, as it turned out, a series of
reductions from a rate of 6½ percent in 2000. The
policy statement accompanying the change in the
policy target concluded with a concern about an
“unwelcome substantial fall in inflation.” The
decline in the inflation rate was only one of a
string of surprises to which the FOMC reacted as
it brought its target rate down. The most shocking
of the surprises, of course, was the terrorist attack
on the United States on September 11, 2001. It
would be time consuming, but not difficult, to
recount this history, pointing to the data releases
and events that led the FOMC to reduce its target
rate between early 2001 and June 2003; such an
account would provide a clear illustration of what
is meant by “data dependence.”
I
am very pleased to participate in the
Annual Outlook Conference here at Middle
Tennessee State University. However, per-
haps strangely, I’ll not say much about the
outlook. Others are better qualified than I to dis-
cuss that subject. My topic is how the Fed adjusts
policy when the economy departs from the cen-
tral tendency outlook. Of course, forecasters com-
monly have somewhat different views, but each
forecaster’s central tendency, or baseline, forecast
provides his or her best guess as to how the econ-
omy will evolve. However, forecasters also need
to be able to say something about probabilities
of other outcomes. The probability distribution
of possible outcomes is substantially affected by
policy responses to deviations from the baseline
outlook if and when those deviations occur. And,
although I say “if and when,” everyone in the
forecasting business knows that our knowledge
of forecast errors requires that we put much more
weight on the “when” than the “if.”
The views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Bill Gavin, vice president in the Research
Division, provided special assistance.
Let me also note at the outset that this speech
is something of a companion to another speech I
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was quite different in the sense that monetary
policy does not appear to have been very data
dependent. Following its meeting on August 12,
2003, the FOMC issued a statement that said,
among other things, that “the Committee believes
that policy accommodation can be maintained
for a considerable period.” The funds rate target
remained at 1 percent for a full year. The era of a
1 percent target ended when the FOMC raised the
target to 1¼ percent on June 30, 2004, a policy
adjustment the FOMC had signaled at its previous
meeting in May. By then, as the economy’s recov-
ery continued, there was no doubt that the FOMC
would have to raise its policy target by a substan-
tial amount to support its long-term inflation
objective.
In each of the next 16 consecutive meetings,
the FOMC voted to raise the target for the federal
funds rate by 25 basis points, finally pausing at 5¼
percent in August of 2006. It appeared to some
that policy was on autopilot, as the FOMC raised
the target by 25 basis points meeting after meeting,
apparently independent of incoming information.
That view, I believe, was mistaken. When the
FOMC began the series of rate increases, in June
2004, the statement included this sentence:
“Nonetheless, the Committee will respond to
changes in economic prospects as needed to fulfill
its obligation to maintain price stability.” Similar
language has appeared in every statement since,
and the minutes of the meetings have emphasized
the same point. What happened over the 18
months after June 2004 was, basically, that incom-
ing data indicated that the economy was so close
to the track expected earlier that there was no rea-
son to depart from the “measured pace” of rate
increases of 25 basis points at every meeting.
My purpose today is to discuss in a systematic
fashion the dependence of policy on new infor-
mation. I can give you a feel, though not a formula,
for why policy decisions are sometimes more data
dependent than at other times. When the target
rate was at 1 percent, or only modestly above, it
was clear that rates had to rise, but a sufficiently
large surprise would have led the FOMC to stop,
slow, or accelerate the increase. In the event, data
surprises were minimal and the FOMC raised the
target by 25 basis points 17 times in a row. Increas-
ingly, though, as the FOMC raised the target funds
rate, policymakers became more sensitive to the
possibility that data surprises could alter the
policy course. As it turned out, the decision to
stop raising rates was determined, in my mind,
less by data surprises than by the economy’s slow-
ing more or less as had been expected many
months before. The August FOMC meeting turned
out to be a good time to pause to take stock of
where the economy stood and the likely course
of events going forward. Whether the August deci-
sion to hold the target funds rate unchanged will
turn out to be a pause in the process of raising
rates, a longer-lasting stop, or even the peak, will
depend on the economy’s evolution in coming
months.
THE MODEL
To operate monetary policy effectively and
to understand how policy actions affect the econ-
omy, the Federal Reserve relies heavily on eco-
nomic theory developed over the span of many
decades. The theoretical framework is compli-
cated in its technical form and implementation
but quite straightforward in its bare-bones abstract
framework. The real economy evolves along a
trend that is buffeted by a variety of economic
shocks. Inflation evolves along a trend that is
determined by monetary policy and also buffeted
by these same economic shocks. Although these
shocks drive the business cycle and make the
near-term uncertain, expectations about longer-
term trends in both real output growth and infla-
tion have become quite stable.
Long-run output growth has almost always
been fairly predictable because its trend is deter-
mined by the trends in the growth of real factors
such as the labor force, the capital stock, and the
level of technology in science, industry, and
management. These trends evolve slowly; since
World War II, real growth has fluctuated around
a 3½ percent average and forecasts of future
growth tend to be centered on that number or
perhaps somewhat lower because labor force
growth is slowing as baby boomers retire.
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been so predictable. Before 1987, there were wide
swings in the inflation trend and, unlike the case
for real gross domestic product (GDP), long-
horizon forecasts of inflation were actually more
uncertain than short-horizon forecasts.2 Today,
after a quarter century of effort by the Fed to
actively contain inflation, inflation has also
become more predictable over all horizons; and
forecasts over longer horizons are now much more
accurate than those over shorter horizons.3 Evi-
dence that long-term inflation has become more
predictable is important, because it means that
the Fed has found a way to anchor the inflation
trend.
Thus, our basic model is of an economy in
which both real growth and the inflation rate are
buffeted by economic shocks in the short run but
then tend to return to predictable long-term trends.
The fluctuations of both output and inflation
around trends have moderated a great deal over
the past 25 years, partly and importantly because
of better monetary policy. This better policy is
due to the Fed concentrating on its objective for
long-run price stability through a more systematic
reaction to incoming information about the eco-
nomic shocks.
At one time, many economists believed that
there was an inherent tension between stabilizing
inflation and stabilizing the real economy. Over
the past 25 years, we have learned that a condi-
tion for stabilizing the real economy is stabilizing
long-run inflation expectations. Thus, one of the
most important things to understand about the
dependence of monetary policy actions on arriving
information is that the Federal Reserve has a deep
commitment to achieving a long-run outcome for
inflation that is in accord with its price stability
objective. Put another way, short-run policy is
strongly motivated by long-run considerations.
MONETARY POLICY
A fundamental component of monetary policy
is the decision about the long-run policy objective
for inflation. This aspect of policy should not be
data dependent. It is possible that an advance in
economic knowledge will teach that we should
have a different long-run inflation objective. No
such advance is on the horizon; but even if it were,
it would not be an exception to the rule that the
policy objective should be independent of incom-
ing information about the current state of the
economy. The policy objective determines the
long-run inflation trend in our model and, more
importantly, the nominal anchor for the economy.
The reaction of policy to incoming news
depends on the state of the economy relative to
the trends. The private sector needs to know the
Federal Reserve’s inflation objective so that it
knows how to view fluctuations around the trend.
Recently, several individual FOMC members
have characterized the long-run inflation goal as
a “comfort zone of 1-2 percent inflation” as meas-
ured by inflation in the chain price index for per-
sonal consumption expenditures. Although the
FOMC itself has not adopted a formal, quantita-
tive inflation objective, several members, includ-
ing me, have said that they believe that greater
clarity about the long-run objective would help
both the Committee and the markets to make more
informed decisions.
It is much easier to agree on a long-run infla-
tion objective than on short-run policy actions
consistent with the objective. There is agreement
on two conflicting principles. First, it is all too
easy to overreact to short-run developments.
Agreement on that principle is reflected in the
FOMC’s emphasis on core inflation—inflation
measures excluding volatile food and energy
prices—as a guide to short-run policy. Moreover,
above-trend inflation may be acceptable under
some circumstances, provided we are confident
that past policy actions have been sufficient to
slow inflation in the future. Nevertheless, there
is also agreement on a second principle: It is all
too easy to allow wishful thinking on inflation
to delay necessary tough policy decisions. The
FOMC does its best to make the right choices
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In one sense, long-run policy is the accumu-
lation of individual short-run policy decisions.
However, if individual decisions reflect only reac-
tions to short-run developments in the economy,
then there is no telling where long-run policy
will go. The right way for the Fed to think about
short-run policy decisions is that they have to be
part of, or fit into, a coherent long-term plan. The
market’s understanding of this plan is central to
the determination of long-term interest rates. In
general, the rate on any bond depends on expected
short rates over the horizon of the bond. Thus, the
10-year Treasury bond rate depends on expecta-
tions of short-term interest rates over the 10-year
horizon.
Market expectations about future interest rates
depend on the interaction of two interrelated
sources of influence. One, obviously, concerns
Federal Reserve decisions on the intended federal
funds rate. Also important are expectations as to
the demands for and supplies of funds in the
private market. For example, with simultaneous
investment and housing booms, credit demands
will be high and interest rates will tend to be bid
up. In pursuing its policy goals, the FOMC will
be adjusting the federal funds rate as needed to
keep the inflation rate low and stable. Thus, the
market forms expectations about the underly-
ing state of the economy that will bear on Fed
decisions.
The Federal Reserve is constantly evaluating
the situation in the markets and trying to adjust
the intended federal funds rate to produce a satis-
factory equilibrium in the economy. When we put
the Federal Reserve’s and the market’s decisions
and expectations together, we have a macro-
economic equilibrium.
The interaction between the Federal Reserve
and the markets may be confusing at first sight,
and indeed was confusing to economists for gen-
erations until conceptual breakthroughs in the
1960s and 1970s clarified the issue. Market behav-
ior depends on expectations as to what the Federal
Reserve is going to do, and what the Federal
Reserve is going to do depends on what the market
and the economy are anticipated to do. The full
rational expectations macroeconomic equilibrium
occurs when the market behaves as the Federal
Reserve expects and the Federal Reserve behaves
as the market expects. In both cases we assume
that the expectations are fully rational, by which
we mean that the expectations are fully informed
on the basis of all available information. The
abstraction of a full rational expectations macro-
economic equilibrium provides a powerful start-
ing point for analysis of a data-dependent policy.
CAN THE MARKET PREDICT
DATA DEPENDENCE?
The “Taylor rule” is a stylized view of the
Fed’s reaction to incoming information. In 1993,
Stanford economist John Taylor proposed a simple
formula relating the federal funds rate to (i) a
long-run inflation target and (ii) short-run devia-
tions of inflation from that target and short-run
deviations of real GDP from a measure of “poten-
tial real GDP.”4 Taylor suggested that his simple
relationship characterized in broad outline the
actual behavior of the federal funds rate in the
early years of the Greenspan FOMC. The essence
of this relationship is that in the long-run the
FOMC seeks to keep the federal funds rate roughly
consistent with a level that is believed to produce
a target level of inflation. Taylor assumed a target
rate of inflation of 2 percent per year measured
by the total consumer price index (CPI). In the
short run, the relationship implies that the FOMC
adjusts the target federal funds rate up as either
the observed inflation rate exceeds its target or
real GDP exceeds potential real GDP. Conversely,
under the Taylor rule, the FOMC reduces the tar-
get federal funds rate when inflation falls below
its target and/or real GDP falls short of potential
real GDP.
The Taylor rule reflects the primacy of a long-
run inflation objective while incorporating short-
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mula for computing a baseline, or reference,
interest rate that is consistent with policy achiev-
ing the Fed’s objectives for both output stabiliza-
tion and price stability. I discussed the Taylor rule
in some detail in the speech I mentioned earlier,
“Understanding the Fed,” and refer you to its
published version in this Review if you want to
dig into the subject more deeply.
Now I’ll turn to some comments on future
Fed policy, but I want to remind you that I am
speaking for myself—other FOMC participants
may have different views about how future policy
adjustments will depend on arriving information.
All economic indicators may have implications
for the evolution of the real economy and inflation.
I emphasize “may” because we have to filter out
as best we can possible data errors and inconsis-
tencies across various indicators.
Before I discuss future Fed policy in any detail,
I begin with a warning. New information drives
both market adjustments and policy changes, but
new information is inherently unpredictable. To
gain a sense of the impact of new information on
interest rates, I’ve analyzed data from the eurodol-
lar futures market and discussed the results in
some detail in “Understanding the Fed.” The
bottom line of that analysis is that forecasts embed-
ded in the eurodollar futures market explain 42
percent of the variance of fluctuations in the actual
eurodollar yield three months ahead. Thus, unpre-
dictable events even over a three-month horizon
are responsible for 58 percent of the variance of
the eurodollar yield. Over a six-month horizon,
unpredictable events are responsible for more than
70 percent of the variance. Thus, I can discuss
various scenarios but have no way of knowing
which scenario will come to pass.
Let’s start with the outlook for the rest of
2006. Forecasts made by FOMC members and
transmitted to Congress in July were 3¼ to 3½
percent growth for real GDP and an increase for
the core personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) chain price index of 2¼ to 2½ percent. As
for 2007, the central tendency of the FOMC mem-
bers’ GDP forecasts is 3 to 3½ percent. This growth
outlook should be consistent with keeping the
economy close to full employment, based on the
Congressional Budget Office forecast of potential
GDP growth of 3.24 percent in 2007. As for infla-
tion, the central tendency forecast of FOMC par-
ticipants for 2007 is 2 to 2¼ percent. Thus,
inflation is expected to recede only very slowly
from its current level.
There are two cases in which the economic
news will pretty clearly predict a change in the
Fed’s policy stance. If incoming economic indi-
cators show that both output and inflation are
rising above these forecasts, then, in the absence
of any other information, we can expect that the
FOMC will increase its target federal funds rate.
On the other hand, if both output and inflation
come in weaker than expected, we are unlikely
to see further increases in the federal funds tar-
get; indeed, if economic weakness is pervasive
enough, the FOMC will at some point reduce the
target funds rate.
The most interesting—not to mention contro-
versial and difficult—cases are those in which the
outlook for inflation and output move in oppo-
site directions. In such cases, the FOMC has to
call on all its experience and judgment to reach a
decision. It is very difficult for me to be precise
about the judgments I am likely to reach based
on incoming information because a host of con-
siderations, some of which I cannot foresee, may
enter the calculus. But I’ll make a stab at how
things could play out to illustrate my thought
process.
A critically important consideration in my
mind concerns the inflation process and the
importance of the Fed’s commitment to low and
stable inflation. It is my conviction that temporiz-
ing on actions to control inflation is an invitation
to trouble. Accepting higher inflation, or even a
continuation of the current rate of inflation, in
an effort to sustain current employment levels
will only lead to more grief later. Once inflation
and inflation expectations rise, the economy will
become less stable and reducing inflation from
an elevated rate will be more costly than taking
the medicine now. Having said that, if inflation
pressures are easing, even if only gradually, and
there is a genuine prospect that inflation will
return to the comfort zone, then I see no reason
to accelerate the decline in inflation by maintain-
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employment. Policy needs to be as disciplined
as necessary to get the job done, but not more so.
The long-run inflation goal and the attitude
I’ve expressed about what risks to take suggest
that I will have a bias in the way I interpret incom-
ing information. If data on the real economy come
in weaker than expected—if it appears that the
economy is falling below the baseline forecast
path—then my bias will be in the direction of
wanting to be sure that the data paint a consistent
picture before I’ll advocate a policy easing. But
if the picture is consistent, and inflation risk is
receding, then I’ll not hesitate to advocate policy
easing.
What I hope the FOMC can accomplish is to
retain full market confidence that the long-run
rate of inflation will remain in the comfort zone.
I hope that forecasters assign very low probabil-
ity to inflation outcomes over the medium term
of 3 to 5 years outside the comfort zone no matter
what the incoming data look like. Although I am
talking about inflation over a horizon well beyond
the usual forecast horizon of 1 to 2 years, the long-
run inflation outlook has a direct bearing on the
forecast. The long bond rate today depends criti-
cally on expected inflation over the maturity of
the bond. Thus, rates that enter importantly into
any economic forecast, such as mortgage and
corporate bond rates, depend on the long-run
inflation outlook. This outlook has been quite
stable in recent years, and that fact is evidence of
a major monetary policy success.
With long-run inflation contained, the FOMC
has flexibility to respond, vigorously if necessary,
to economic weakness should it arise. The FOMC
brought the target federal funds rate down aggres-
sively in 2001 in response to incoming informa-
tion. Aggressive easing kept the recession mild.
If the economy comes in below the baseline fore-
cast in coming quarters, the FOMC will have room
to act as aggressively as required. I have no idea
what scale of easing might be appropriate, for
that will depend on the nature of the incoming
information. Still, I believe forecasters should
assign a relatively low probability to deep reces-
sion precisely because of the FOMC’s demon-
strated willingness to act aggressively as necessary.
I’ve given you my take on what data depend-
ence means and the attitudes that underlie my
likely responses. I’ve also emphasized that an
efficient rational expectations equilibrium requires
that the market behave as the policymakers expect
and policymakers behave as the market expects.
The market’s evaluation of the prospects for pol-
icy is revealed in the futures markets for federal
funds and eurodollar deposits. Current futures
prices predict that the federal funds target is
expected to begin moving down. Because these
market quotes change day by day in response to
new information, I do not want to attempt to be
particularly precise as to the timing—anything I
write as I draft these remarks may be out of date
by the time I deliver them or within a few weeks,
anyway. What I can safely note is that the market’s
expectation of future policy easing has been taking
hold gradually since late June, say, in response
to data on the real economy suggesting that real
growth is slowing and inflation data suggesting
that the worst may be over on that front.
Although expectations about future policy
actions are revealed transparently in the futures
market for short-term interest rates, I want to
underscore my earlier point about the limited
accuracy of those forecasts. Some of the forecast
misses have been pretty dramatic. For example,
in December 2000, the futures market forecasts
were for a decline in the eurodollar yield of 35
basis points over the following three months
and a total of 67 basis points over the six-month
period. Instead, the FOMC acted aggressively to
lower the funds rate target starting in January and
continuing through May 2001 by a total of 250
basis points. The FOMC acted aggressively as
incoming information pointed to growing weak-
ness in economic activity. Both the FOMC and
the markets were surprised by incoming informa-
tion indicating that the economy was weakening
quickly and significantly.
Although I cannot predict unpredictable new
information, I’ve tried to provide a sense of how
I might respond to new information as it arrives.
I note, however, that it is rare that a single data
report is decisive. The economic outlook is deter-
mined by numerous pieces of information. Impor-
tant data such as the inflation and the employment
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tion. The FOMC is aware of the possibility of data
revisions and short-run anomalies. Sometimes
data ought to be discounted because of anomalous
behavior.
An example was the increase in tobacco
prices in late 1998. Tobacco prices had a transi-
tory impact on measured inflation, both total and
core indices, during December 1998 and January
1999, but produced no lasting effect on trend
inflation. Similarly, information about real activity
sometimes arrives that indicates transitory shocks
to aggregate output and employment. An example
of such a transitory shock is the strike against
General Motors in June and July 1998. Similarly,
the September 2005 employment report reflected
the impact of Hurricane Katrina, which was
expected to be, and turned out to be, temporary
from a national perspective.
Transitory and anomalous shocks to the data
are ordinarily rather easy to identify. Both Fed and
market economists develop estimates of these
aberrations in the data shortly after they occur.
The principle of looking through aberrations is
easy to state but probably impossible to formalize
with any precision. We know these shocks when
we see them, but could never construct a com-
pletely comprehensive list of such shocks ex ante.
Policymakers piece together a picture of the
economy from a variety of data, including anec-
dotal observations. When the various observa-
tions fit together to provide a coherent picture,
the Fed can adjust the intended rate with some
confidence. The market generally understands
this process, as it draws similar conclusions from
the same data.
So, given policy objectives, and given a view
about how policy decisions affect the economy,
the central bank can in principle specify a policy
rule, or response function, that guides policy
adjustments in response to incoming information.
To achieve a good result, the general public and
market participants need to understand the objec-
tives and the response function so that the private
economy can determine its activities with full
knowledge of how the central bank will act. Of
course, uncertainty is an inherent characteristic
of the economic world. What should be predict-
able are the central bank’s responses to the never-
ending sequence of surprises that characterize
the economic environment.
Market commentary often indicates frustra-
tion that the FOMC does not lay out a clearer path
for policy, arguing that the FOMC is unpredict-
able. That view, I believe, is off base. Typically
the FOMC cannot be predictable with regard to
the path of the target federal funds rate because
new information driving policy adjustments is
not predictable. All of us would like to be able to
predict the future. We in the Fed do the best we
can, but the markets should not complain that
the FOMC lacks clairvoyance! What the FOMC
strives to do is to respond systematically to the
new information. There is considerable evidence
that the market does successfully predict FOMC
responses to the available information at the
time of regularly scheduled meetings.5
CONCLUDING COMMENT
To say that policy is data dependent means
that policy changes will depend on the incoming
news about the state of the economy, both real
growth and inflation. That the policy setting is
data dependent is a good sign. It means that policy
is in a range than can be considered neutral—
that is, thought to be consistent with the Fed’s
longer-run policy objectives. It is important to
remember that the long-run inflation objective
should not be data dependent. If the objective is
well understood, people will know whether the
current inflation rate is above or below the desired
trend. They will know how to interpret incoming
information to gauge what it means for the policy
stance. I believe that is just about exactly where
we are today.
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